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COMMENT
Partisan Values in the Lower Courts:
Reapportionment in Ohio and
Michigan
Kathleen L. Barber*
N REYNOLDS V. SIMS1 the Supreme Court held that the equal
protection clause of the 14th amendment requires both houses
of a state bicameral assembly to be apportioned on the basis of
equal population districts. Although a myriad of books and arti-
cles have been written about the Court's role in the process of
change, little analytic attention has been directed toward the sub-
sequent but important events in the lower courts of the state and
federal judicial systems which have sought to implement the man-
date of the Supreme Court.2 As a result of the order these courts
have become recognized as the legitimate locus of decision-making
for apportionment controversies. However, because the reappor-
tionment cases require a kind of political decision on the part of
the judiciary, questions of judicial partisanship have become signif-
icant.
Initially, the aura of illegitimacy which surrounds judicial par-
ticipation in partisan decision-making needs to be dispelled in order
to clear the way for an empirical examination of cases which par-
take of this characteristic. The representational nature of- both
state and federal judicial systems is recognized by the mode of se-
lection of judges, yet the popular myth of judicial impartiality
denies the propriety of a representational role for courts as institu-
* THE AUTHOR: KATHLEEN L. BARBER (B.A., Wellesley College; M.A. and Ph.
D., Case Western Reserve University) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at
John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio.
1377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2 With reapportionment litigation still pending in a few states, a nationwide re-
structuring of the state legislative electoral base had occurred by 1967. In only three
states - Kentucky, Maine, and South Dakota - had legislatures and electorates created
population-based assemblies without judicial participation. State courts were drawn
into the controversy in 24 states; lower federal courts participated in 40 states. Seven-
teen states, in which interaction between state and lower federal courts occurred, pro-
vided the overlap. See Council of State Governments, Legislative Reapportionment
in the States (July 1967); 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 766 (1968).
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tions. The process of appointment in the federal court system, ex-
cept in the Supreme Court where broader political considerations
may override partisan ones, is clearly party-oriented. District court
appointments are made within the constraints of senatorial courtesy
where appropriate; in states where the administration party is not
represented in the United States Senate, the state party organization
is, by custom, accorded a significant if not determinative voice.
Federal Courts of Appeal are usually manned by district judges
deemed worthy of promotion and found within the proper party.3
In a majority of state court systems, the electorate participates
directly. Thirty-two states provide for elective judges; 18 of these
use partisan, and 14, nonpartisan ballots. Partisan nominations in
the latter group, either by convention or by primary, reduce the sig-
nificance of the nonpartisan ballot.4  Only six states select judges
by gubernatorial appointment with consent of the state senate. Of
the remaining 12 states, seven provide some combination of ap-
pointment and subsequent election, while five require the legisla-
ture to elect the judges.'
The reapportionment decision-making process is further compli-
cated by the deeply political nature of the questions sought to be
resolved. For example, while the historic urban-rural cleavage in
American politics has been reduced in significance by demographic,
economic, sociological, and technological developments, the appar-
ent persistence of urban-rural conflict in state legislatures camou-
flages differences which are partisan in nature and which reflect far
more complex interest groupings within both metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas. In dramatic cases, suburban and rural legisla-
tors in reapportioned assemblies have joined in conservative coali-
tions to preserve the status quo. In New Jersey, for example, where
northern suburban areas were most severely under represented in the
old legislature, a 3-to-1 Republican majority was returned after re-
apportionment, and grave policy conflicts have developed between
the Democratic, urban-oriented governor and the reapportioned leg-
islature.6 In Tennessee, Ohio, and Michigan, subdistricting accom-
panied reapportionment as a political price exacted by groups seek-
ing structural ways to hold or gain power.
3 See text accompanying notes 23 & 26 infra.
4 Nagel, Political Party Aflilation and Judges Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Sd. REv. 843,
850 (1961).
5 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1966-67, at
116-17 (1966).
6 N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1968, § 1, at 26, col. 1; id. May 12, 1968, § E, at 6, col. 1.
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Although Chief Justice Warren, in Reynolds v. Sims, defined
the goal of judicially enforced reapportionment to be "fair and ef-
fective representation, ' 7 in reality the Supreme Court has failed to
provide workable guidelines for resolution of these difficult po-
litical questions.8 The judges in lower federal and state courts
have been left "free" to decide them in accord with standards other
than legal precedent. These judges may satisfy judicial norms by
"representing" law or justice in reapportionment decisions by ap-
plying the requirement of equal population districts in both houses
of state legislatures. At the same time and in the same decisions,
judges may "represent" groups seeking to gain or hold power
through legislative apportionment, by approving or withholding
approval of alleged gerrymanders, and by validating or invalidat-
ing changes in the number of representatives per district.
Judicial response to pressures within the political system may
occur in a variety of ways which are difficult to define and which
may merge in the person of a single judge. Direct response to the
bidding of a political party is probably rare, although this is diffi-
cult to verify empirically.' Indirect response to needs expressed
by groups in the political system with which judges have been and
may still be identified is more probable. The deepest and possibly
unconscious level of response reflects consonance of the values of
judges and parties with which they have been affiliated, values
which predispose judges both to associate themselves with a given
party and to make decisions which favor that party.
7 377 U.S. at 565-66.
8 Equal population districts which, within the limits of census data and population
mobility can be mathematically defined, do not provide in and of themselves "fair" re-
presentation. Within the bounds of equal population requirements, district lines may
be drawn either to handicap or to enhance the power of racial or partisan groups in the
potential electorate. Control of the boundary setting agency remains a crucial means
of access to political power. Gerrymanders, once executed by over or under population
of districts, still may be achieved by more sophisticated techniques. Districting by com-
puter, for example - a fast and efficient method - involves programming the control
agency's value judgments and political choices to guide the computer in its selection of
populations as it builds districts of equal numbers of people. See Nagel, Simplified
Bipartisan Computer Redistricting, 17 STAN. L. REv. 863-64 (1965).
9 The exploration of judicial motivation is a task fraught with difficulties. The most
promising method, psychoanalysis, is not available for obvious reasons. Interviewing
judges, a method which Theodore Becker is exploring with optimistic expectations, is
particularly inappropriate for investigation of partisan motivation, since party-oriented
judicial behaviors conflicts so flagrantly with judicial canons that judges would be un-
likely to be capable of admitting such behavior even to themselves, let alone to curious
political scientists. If a decision coincided with the interest of a party with which thejudge had some past or present affiliation, he would, of political and even psychologi-
cal necessity, be likely to rationalize his decision by legal standards. Becker, A Survey
Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effects on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations, 60 Am.
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The hypothesis that judges' decisions and political party affilia-
tion are in some way related is supported by Nagel's findings,
based on a study of 298 state and federal supreme court judges. 10
Excluding judges from courts which were solidly manned by mem-
bers of one party, and excluding unanimous decisions, Nagel found
statistically significant correlations between the political party vari-
able and the favored litigant in nine types of cases in which the
issues at stake were socio-economic in character. The most sig-
nificant correlations showed Democratic judges tending to favor
the administrative agency in business regulation cases, the claimant
in unemployment compensation cases, and the employee in em-
ployee injury cases; Republican judges tended to favor the oppos-
ing party in these suits. Nagel does not suggest that he has
proven a causal connection. His hypothesis is that personal stand-
ards of judges may account both for decisions and party affilia-
tion. Indirectly, however, "party affiliation may be responsible
for some decisional propensity by virtue of the fact that a judge's
party affiliation may have a feedback reinforcement on his value
system which in turn determines his decisional propensities."' 1  In-
dividual deviance, reflecting lack of consonance between value
systems and party affiliation, may be explained by traditional fam-
ily or sectional party allegiances; or, in the case of a specific issue,
personal experience. A judge who previously served as a prosecut-
ing attorney, for instance, may have liberal attitudes which do not
extend to criminal cases.' 2
Nagel explored devices such as the nonpartisan ballot, judicial
appointment, and long terms of office, which are used in various
states to decrease the relationship between partisan influences and
judicial decisions. His analysis shows that of these variables, only
the appointive selection factor significantly interrupted the pattern
of partisan tendencies of judges. The apparently more independ-
POL. Scr. REV. 677 (1966). Gething attempted the interview technique in an investi-
gation of reapportionment decisions in the Michigan Supreme Court Only one of eight
justices was willing to be interviewed, and his responses about determinants of his de-
cisions were given in terms of rational-legal arguments. J. Gething, Interest Groups,
the Courts, and Legislative Reapportionment in Michigan, 1967 (unpublished disserta-
tion in Univ. of Michigan Library). In light of the fact that analysis of eight reappor-
tionment decisions in the Michigan Supreme Court showed high consistency of voting
within blocs defined by party affiliation, id., the usefulness of interviewing to investi-
gate this type of judicial problem appears minimal. Ulmer, Communication, 55 AM.
POL. ScI. REV. 1098-1100 (1961).
'oNagel, supra note 4.
11 Id. at 847.
12 Id.
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ent stance of appointed state judges may be due to appointments
across party lines sometimes provided for by state tradition or law.
If required to choose a candidate from the opposite party, a gov-
ernor would tend to appoint a person whose values were closer to
his own; for example, a liberal Republican or a conservative Demo-
crat. Nomination by special bipartisan or nonpartisan commissions
may also be associated with independent judicial behavior."3 Non-
partisan elections, however, did not reduce the significance of the
party variable, because nominations are usually partisan; nor did
the length of term.'
The hypothesis that there is a relationship between reapportion-
ment decisions and judicial partisanship can be more dearly seen
through a comparison of the reapportionment cases. A useful ex-
ample is that of the politics - judicial, legislative, and electoral
- of reapportionment in Ohio and Michigan, where a significant
association has been found between party affiliation and the party
interest in judicial controversies in the decision-making behavior
of both state and federal judges. The two states were chosen be-
cause both are middle-western, highly industrial, and urban. Both
contain not only the traditionally Democratic urban areas and Re-
publican countryside, but also Republican cities and isolated rural
areas that consistently return Democratic majorities. Patterns of
population mobility leading to mushrooming suburbs and declin-
ing core cities accompanied population growth in both states be-
tween 1950 and 1960. Nevertheless, there is one apparent differ-
ence - the partisan outcome of reapportionment.
Prior to reapportionment these cross cleavages of ecological
and partisan characteristics provided the backdrop for legislatures
that were constitutionally biased in favor of rural representation.
Although both state assemblies struggled with various reappor-
tionment plans in the wake of Baker v. Carr,'1 neither reached a
successful legislative conclusion. In Ohio, a partisan supreme court
endorsed the work of a partisan apportionment board, while in
13 Since neither custom nor law requires appointment across party lines in the
federal judiciary, this source of independence of appointed judges would not be ex-
pected to be significant in the behavior of federal judges.
14 Nagel, supra note 4, at 848.
15 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The new apportionments approximated the equal popu-
lation standard in both houses; Michigan's is statistically the "most equal" in the na-
tion, that is, with the smallest variance among district populations. Both new plans
replaced some multi-member districts with an entirely single-member district structure.
Both have been attacked as partisan gerrymanders - Ohio's as Republican, Michigan's
as Democratic.
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Michigan a partisan supreme court resolved the deadlock of an
equally divided apportionment commission. In both states, the
judiciary is elected on nonpartisan ballots, but party primaries in
Ohio and party conventions in Michigan serve as vehicles of nom-
ination for judicial candidates.
Quantatively the reapportionment decisions in these two states
consists of 13 cases: two lower federal 6 and two state court deci-
sions17 in Ohio; one lower federal' and eight state court cases19 in
Michigan. A total of 27 judges participated in these decisions; of
these, 22, or 82 percent, voted consistently with the apparent in-
terest of the party whose label they bore. Five, or 18 percent, cast
what will be called here an independent vote in at least one case.20
Table 1 presents a summary of the judges' voting pattern accord-
ing to party background and court.
In the federal apportionment cases supposedly nonpartisan
judges appeared to have reached conclusions of a representational
nature. Although federal judges, unlike members of the state elec-
tive judiciary, are appointed to their posts, in reality these federal
benches are only an electoral step removed from the direct repre-
sentative process. By virtue of the use of the three-judge court in
the reapportionment cases, the chief judge of the circuit has the au-
thority to determine the composition of the federal panels hearing
the apportionment cases.21 ln all three federal cases, the panels,
with a Republican majority, were selected by a Republican chief
judge.
For example, in the first Ohio case, Nolan v. Rhodes," Chief
16 Nolan v. Rhodes, 218 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. Ohio 1963), rev'd per curiam, 378
U.S. 556 (1964), on remand, 251 F. Supp. 584 (S.D. Ohio 1965), aff'd per curiam, 383
U.S. 104 (1966).
17 State ex rel. King v. Rhodes, 11 Ohio St. 2d 95, 228 N.E. 2d 653 (1967). The
lower court opinion was unreported.
I Marshall v. Hare, 227 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S.
561 (1964).
1 9 In re Apportionment, 376 Mich. 410, 137 N.W.2d 495 (1965), aff'd on rehear-
ing, 377 Mich. 396, 140 N.W.2d 436, appeal dismissed sub nom. Badgley v. Hare, 385
U.S. 114 (1966); In re Apportionment, 373 Mich. 250, 128 N.W.2d 722 (1964);
In re Apportionment, 372 Mich. 418, 128 N.W.2d 350, modified and vacated, 373
Mich. 247, 128 N.W.2d 721 (1964); Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63
(1960), vacated and remanded, 369 U.S. 429, on remand, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d
350 (1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990 (1964).
20 "Independent" is defined as a vote either in opposition to the interest of the
judge's party, or in an ambiguous fashion that failed to further the interest of the
judge's party, when it was possible to help it.
2128 U.S.C. § 2284(1) (1964).
22218 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. Ohio 1963), rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 556 (1964).
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TABLE 1.- Partisan Affiliation and Voting Behavior of Judges Participating
in Reapportionment Decisions, Ohio and Michigan, 1960-1967
State Court of Appeals State Supreme Court Federal Court
Republican Democratic Republican Democratic Republican Democratic
Ohio: Number of
Judges Who Voted:
According to
Party-line 0 3 5 1 2 0
Independently 0 0 1 0 0 1
Total 0 3 6 1 2 1
Michigan: Number of
Judges Who Voted:
According to
Party-line 3 5 2
Independently .... 1 2 0 0
Total .... 4 7 2 1
Circuit Judge Lester Cecil, a Republican from Dayton, convened
two Republicans and a Democrat to form the panel: Circuit Judge
Weick, former Republican treasurer of Summit County; District
Judge Weinman, former Republican prosecutor of Steubenville;
and District Judge Peck, former secretary to Democratic Senator
Frank Lausche.23
By the time of the second Ohio federal reapportionment case,24
and the only Michigan reapportionment case filed in federal court,
Marshall v. Hare,2 5 Judge Weick had succeeded Cecil as chief
judge of the Sixth Circuit. In Ohio, Judge Weick appointed him-
self to sit with his two colleagues in the earlier Ohio apportion-
ment case to hear the new plea. In Michigan, he appointed Circuit
Judge O'Sullivan, former Republican National Chairman; District
Judge Kaess, former chairman of the Wayne County Republican
Committee and prominent Republican lawyer; and District Judge
Roth, a former Democratic state attorney general.26  In all three
2 3 As a result of his conservative stance in state and national politics Senator
Lausche had built a large Republican electoral following without sacrificing patronage
privileges in the Democratic administrations. As his associate and nominee, Judge
Peck could be expected to shun a partisan role on the bench.
24 Nolan v. Rhodes, 251 F. Supp. 584 (S.D. Ohio 1965), aff'd per curiam, 383
U.S. 104 (1966).
25 227 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 561 (1964).
26 judge Roth was appointed to the federal bench by President Kennedy in 1962.
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cases, the Republican majority favored the interest of the Repub-
lican party of the state in electing as many of its members to the
legislature as possible.
Although these federal judges were not elected, their appoint-
ments reflected representative processes. Eisenhower, who ap-
pointed all of the Republican judges, had won the electoral votes
of both states each time he ran for President. In Ohio, where the
1960 electoral vote went to Vice President Nixon, the Democratic
judge was selected by independent-oriented Senator Frank Lausche
and he voted with his Republican colleagues on reapportionment. In
Michigan, where President Kennedy won the 1960 electoral vote,
the Democratic judge dissented and upheld what was, in that situ-
ation, essentially a Democratic position in state politics. This is
not to suggest that a causal relationship has been established be-
tween party affiliation and these judicial decisions, but that the ap-
pointment of judges with preexisting political philosophies, pro-
viding them with tools of analysis in a given situation, performs a
representative function in society. It is a function no less impor-
tant for an appointed than an elected judiciary, however indirect
or inferential it may be for the former.
A brief summary of the issues in the three federal cases will
serve to indicate the nature of the partisan interest. Nolan's suit
in the first Ohio case challenged the Hanna Amendment to the
state constitution, which had been approved in 1903 by 98 per-
cent of the voters, including a majority in every county in the state.
The rapidly growing urban population, as revealed by the 1900
Census, had led to a combined rural and conservative effort to
write into the state's apportionment provisions a guarantee to every
county, regardless of population, of one representative in the lower
house.27 By 1960, when the urban proportion of the state's popula-
tion passed 70 percent, 48 of the 88 counties lacked populations
equal to the one-half ratio of population required before 1903; 71
counties fell below the single ratio. In spite of areas of Demo-
cratic strength in the rural hills of southern Ohio, and strong Re-
publican cities such as Cincinnati and Columbus, the Hanna Amend-
ment inflated rural Republican strength enough to provide a reli-
able Republican majority in the state house of representatives.
Since 1952, only the "Right to Work" issue, placed on the ballot
in 1958, had brought out large enough numbers of Democratic
voters to overcome the constitutional handicap to the Democratic
27 OHIo CONST. art XI, § 2 (1903).
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party, and to enable it to win a majority in the house. Invalidation
of the amendment and removal of the half-ratio provision from the
state constitution would have left Ohio with a population-based
assembly.
In opening judicial channels to groups seeking apportionment
revision, however, the United States Supreme Court had left the
lower courts free to devise their own criteria of fairness.2" This the
federal court did, upholding the Hanna Amendment on the grounds
of (1) the federal analogy; (2) the open political process in Ohio
which provides several means for amending the state constitution;
(3) the rationality of a system of checks and balances; and (4)
general custom among American state legislatures to elect one
house on a population base, the other on a geographical base.
"About one-half of the states in the Union have legislative bodies
so apportioned. Can it be said that they are all irrational?'29 Sig-
nificantly, however, the Supreme Court could say so, and did in Rey-
nolds v. Sims,3" which the Court cited in its per curiam reversal of
the federal court in Ohio."'
On remand, the district court used a potent defensive weapon,
the right to delay. Judicial vacations, taken in sequence instead of
simultaneously, in addition to full extension of legal delays to the
defendants, enabled the state, under the control of a Republican
administration, to hold the 1964 elections on the basis of the old
apportionment. The delays also extended through the debate in
the United States Senate on the Dirksen amendment to the United
States Constitution, an attempt to prevent application of the popu-
lation-base principle to both houses of state legislatures. The day
after defeat of the Dirksen amendment in the Senate, the federal
court in Ohio finally set a date for hearing the arguments in the
Nolan case.32
In its second decision, the Ohio federal court declared the
Hanna Amendment unconstitutional under the principles of Rey-
nolds v. Sims and upheld the plan of the apportionment board, an ad-
ministrative body whose three members were Republican state of-
ficials. The district boundaries of the board plan had been drawn
by Republicans, opening the plan to the charge of Republican
28 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
29 Nolan v. Rhodes, 218 F. Supp. 953, 958 (S.D. Ohio 1963), rev'd per curiam,
378 U.S. 556 (1964).
30 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
31378 U.S. 556 (1964).
32 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 3, 1964, at 25, col. 1.
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gerrymander. The urban multi-member districts, which had en-
abled the Democrats to offset some of their losses from under-rep-
resentation in the cities, were divided into small, single-member
districts, promising the potential of legislative seats for suburban
Republicans in the metropolitan delegations.
Subsequently, Democratic senate leader Frank King brought
suit in the Franklin County Court of Appeals in Columbus, to void
the action of the apportionment board as illegal, unconstitutional,
and a usurpation of judicial power.33 This challenge in a state
tribunal provided the federal court with an appropriate means of
delaying its decision on the constitutionality of the board plan,
since interpretation of administrative powers under the state con-
stitution was a proper function of the state courts. However, the
partisan interest in delay was now reversed, and Republican leaders
pressed for federal judicial action to validate the board plan.
Presiding Judge Weick acceded to the pressure for a decision.
Noting that if the decision were delayed, there was a possibility of
a breakdown in state election machinery for the 1966 election, the
federal court ordered the board plan into effect on a temporary
basis.14  The board's action under the state constitution was ac-
corded the presumption of validity "until or unless ...dissipated
by determination by the Ohio courts." 5  This decision was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court in February 1966,6 although the
question of the board's authority was still being litigated and would
not be settled until June 1967." In both Ohio federal court deci-
sions the panel acted unanimously, confirming the expectation that
Democratic Judge Peck would not necessarily represent the inter-
ests of the Democratic party.
In Michigan, August Scholle, President of the Michigan AFL-
CIO, and his vice president Marshall, decided to transfer their ap-
portionment controversy from the state supreme court to the fed-
eral judicial arena because of virulent attacks on the state court, in-
cluding threats of impeachment from Republican legislative leaders
following invalidation of the 1952 Senate apportionment. It has
been widely assumed that federal court jurisdiction was invoked
because Democratic Justice Adams was defeated by Republican
33 Id., Oct. 19, 1965, at 1, col. 1.
34 Nolan v. Rhodes, 251 F. Supp. 584, 587-88 (S.D. Ohio 1965), afj'd per curiam,
383 U.S. 104 (1966).
35 Id. at 587.
36 383 U.S. 104 (1966).
37 State ex rel. King v. Rhodes, 11 Ohio St. 2d 95, 228 N.E.2d 653 (1967).
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O'Hara in the 1962 judicial election, thereby creating an even par-
tisan division on the state's high bench instead of a Democratic
majority."' It seems unlikely, however, that Scholle would be so
naive to believe that he could be assured of a favorable partisan
majority on the federal court panel, which would be selected by
Sixth Circuit Chief Judge Weick. The more rational explanation
for the transfer from state to federal court lies in the strategy to
remove, at least temporarily, the severe pressure on the Demo-
cratic justices of the state tribunal, a strategy which also had par-
tisan overtones.
The issue at stake in Maarshall v. Hare"0 was the validity of the
apportionment plan in the 1963 state constitution, which provided
a balance of population and area factors, well advertised as the
"80-20" formula. Partisan perceptions of the plan were under-
scored by the fact that the new constitution, of which the appor-
tionment plan was the most controversial feature, had been written
and approved by the Republican majority in the 1962 constitu-
tional convention, over the nearly solid opposition of the Demo-
cratic members of the convention. The partisan interest in Michi-
gan apportionment was heated and bitter on both sides.
Republican Judges O'Sullivan and Kaess formed the majority
upholding the constitutional apportionment provisions; Democratic
Judge Roth dissented. In the court's opinion, Judge Kaess justified
the over-representation of the people of the Upper Peninsula on
the basis of their economic disadvantage, their remoteness from the
seats of power, and the uniqueness of their problems. A model of
judicial restraint, Judge Kaess declined to substitute "tyranny by
the judiciary" for majority rule. The citizens of Michigan, he said,
had just adopted their new constitution."
Judge Roth's dissent was based on an accurate forecast of Rey-
nolds v. Sims, a decision which would soon provide the ground for
Supreme Court reversal of Roth's colleagues. Roth challenged
the majority's view of the new state constitution as the "voice of
the people," since it had been written by a convention whose elec-
toral base was unrepresentative and adopted by a majority of less
than 1 percent. Furthermore, he found the apportionment plan to
be in conflict with the new state constitution's equal protection
clause, guaranteeing, in Roth's view, the equality of the individual's
38 S. KRISLOV, Tim SUPREME COURT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 38 (1965).
39 227 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Mich.) rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 561 (1964).
40 Id. at 993-94.
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vote. With reasoning which anticipated the Supreme Court in
Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 41 Roth urged that "constitu-
tional law is not a matter of majority vote. Indeed, the philosophy
of the Fourteenth Amendment teaches us that it is personal rights
which are to be protected against the will of the majority. ' 42 This
view appeared vindicated when the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded Marshall, citing both Reynolds and Lucas.43
In the limited sphere of the state reapportionment cases, judi-
cial events in Ohio and Michigan suggest that the outcome of con-
flict in the state court systems can be more clearly related to the
party affiliation of judges than to any other factor. State judicial
involvement in apportionment in Ohio turned on the authority of
the apportionment board to draw district boundaries and to create
single-member districts in an entirely new plan. The constitutional
mandate of the board was to increase or decrease the number of rep-
resentatives for constitutionally established districts once each 10
years, following the decennial census. In State ex rel. King v.
Rhodes,44 Senator King charged that the board had abused its
power by holding secret sessions and had usurped judicial author-
ity by deciding which portions of the state constitution to treat as
valid.4' The choice of forum at the seat of state government was
legally correct, but also favorable to the plaintiff in partisan char-
acter. Three Democratic judges heard the arguments.
Republican Attorney General Saxbe, who in 1964, when his
party's interest lay in preserving the old apportionment, had argued
that the apportionment board lacked authority to act until after the
1970 census, now defended the board's 1965 apportionment. Be-
cause the constitutional provisions were severable, he said, the
board's right to act survived the invalidation of the Hanna Amend-
ment and the half-ratio provision which had prevented population
equality among districts.46 Denying the allegation of secrecy, Saxbe
argued that the meetings of the board were open "for anyone to
41377 U.S. 713 (1964).
42 227 F. Supp. at 1007.
43 378 U.S. 561 (1964).
44 11 Ohio St. 2d 95, 228 N.E.2d 653 (1967). The lower court opinion was un-
reported.
45 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 19, 1965, at 1, col. 1.
46Brief for Defendant, State ex rel. King v. Rhodes, cited in 11 Ohio St. 2d 95,
126, 228 N.E.2d 653, 672 (1967).
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attend," but admitted that the two sessions at which house and sen-
ate plans were approved had not been "announced in advance."""
The Democratic judges on the appeals bench upheld King,
ruling that the board, having met and acted once following the
1960 census, had no authority to meet again until after the next de-
cennial census. The court relied on historical tradition as well as
on the language of the state constitution. "For more than one
hundred years," one newspaper quoted the court as saying, "it has
been the practice based upon the language used in the constitu-
tion for this board to meet once and only once each 10 years. '48
The defendant, Republican Governor Rhodes, appealed to the
Ohio Supreme Court, a body of seven judges elected statewide. In
1967 this bench was composed of a Republican chief justice, five
other Republican judges and one Democratic judge. Republican
Judge Matthias spoke for the majority in an opinion reversing the
lower court, ruling that as a matter of state law, the constitutional
provisions were severable, hence the board's authority to act sur-
vived the invalidity of the other portions of article XI of the Ohio
Constitution.49 Judge Matthias found in the state constitution an
implied power for the board to determine new districts, and con-
cluded by transforming this implied power into a "mandatory
duty." 50 The Ohio Supreme Court also relied on the federal court
validation of the board plan as additional support for its conclu-
sion, although the federal panel had specifically and emphatically
deferred to the state court on the question of the board's author-
ity. 51
Republican Judge O'Neill, joined by the lone Democrat on the
bench, Judge Zimmerman, attacked the majority in a stinging dis-
sent. Referring to the May 1967, referendum on the apportion-
ment board plan, Judge O'Neill accused the majority of using judi-
cial power "to amend the constitution to make effective the exact
apportionment that the voters have just rejected."5 2  The board's
authority, the dissenters objected, was not severable from the in-
valid sections of article XI of the state constitution; the board had
no general authority to apportion. Admitting that the federal
court's opinion was res judicata with respect to the 1966 election,
47 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 19, 1965, at 6, col. 5.
48 Id., July 20, 1966, at 2, col. 3.
49 11 Ohio St. 2d at 104, 228 N.E.2d at 672.
5od. at 104, 228 N.E.2d at 659.
5lId. at 103, 228 N.E.2d at 658.
52 Id. at 108, 228 N.E.2d at 662.
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Judge O'Neill denied that the court's temporary order could be
relied on to uphold the board's authority, a question which the fed-
eral court "specifically reserved ...for the decision of the Ohio
courts."53 An implied power to establish new districts could not
exist "unless there is some express power from which the implica-
tion of power arises," and no such power was granted in the state
constitution.54
The intensely partisan nature of the judicial process in Michi-
gan reflects a high degree of party conflict in the coordinate
branches of state government. Among the reasons for the inten-
sity of party conflict in Michigan, compared to the relatively muted
competition of Ohio politics, is the contrasting distribution of the
urban population, which accounts for about 73 percent of the total
population in both states. Although Michigan has 10 standard
metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's), half of the state's popula-
tion resides in one of them, metropolitan Detroit. Only 17 per-
cent of Ohio's population lives in greater Cleveland, the largest of
the 13 SMSA's in Ohio, while even the three largest (Cleveland,
Columbus, and Cincinnati) account for less than a third of the
state's population. Unimetropolitan dominance in Michigan has
led to strong outstate fears in state politics, while Ohio's multi-
metropolitan population distribution has a moderating effect on
intrastate conflict.
While Cleveland rivals Detroit in the preponderance of Demo-
cratic voting behavior, its strength is offset by Republican voting
habits in Columbus and Cincinnati. Although some Michigan
metropolitan areas tend to vote Republican, their relative strength
in the state is far less, and their insistence on structural protec-
tion, such as area-based representation, correspondingly more in-
tense.
Another factor which has led to more passionate partisan con-
flict in Michigan than in Ohio is found in the history of party com-
petition in each state. Until the advent of the automobile assem-
bly line, Michigan had a one-party system. Democratic successes
were rare between the Civil War and the New Deal. Because of
the break with tradition which Democratic majorities represent,
the voting patterns of the past 3 decades have contained the ele-
ment of threat to long-established sectors of the population. Be-
cause of Ohio's more gradual and diversified industrialization, so-
531d. at 115, 228 N.E.2d at 666.
54 Id. at 120, 228 N.E.2d at 669.
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cial, economic, and political change has occurred less rapidly. Al-
though Republicans were dominant in Ohio between the Civil War
and the turn of the century, margins were slim and politics com-
petitive. Since 1900, the parties have shared power both in state
politics and in national allegiance.
By the 1960's, however, the parties were competitive enough in
both states to prevent resolution of apportionment difficulties
through the traditional representative institutions of the executive
and legislature. Although Ohio's judiciary has been elective since
1851, Michigan constitution makers did not accede to popular de-
mands for elective judges until 1908. Republican dominance in
Michigan politics extended to the courts until the 1930's, when it
was challenged by the growing power of a labor-Democratic coali-
tion. What has been characterized as the "basest" kind of political
competition for judgeships led to a constitutional amendment in
1939 instituting the nonpartisan ballot for judicial elections. The
method for nominating judicial candidates was left to the legisla.
ture, which delegated the task to the political parties. 55
In practice, the system has remained partisan. Newspaper cov-
erage of elections includes partisan affiliation of judicial candi-
dates; some aspiring judges emphasize their party in campaigning.
For example, Chief Justice Kavanagh, Governor Williams' attor-
ney general whose election to the bench in 1957 first created a
Democratic majority on the Michigan Supreme Court, appealed
during his campaign for the election of Democrats to the court in
order for the people to secure "equal justice." 56
The governor's power to appoint judges to unexpired terms is
often used to increase party representation in the judiciary; ap-
pointed judges gain a major advantage in running as incumbents
for a full term. Governor Williams' 14-year incumbency provided
his party's margin on the state's high bench; three of five "Wil-
liams men" reached the supreme court by first being appointed to
unexpired terms."T Partisan behavior on that court has been docu-
mented both by the judges themselves, in quotations collected by
Ulmer on the difference between "Republican justice" and "Demo-
cratic justice," and by their record in the area of workman's com-
pensation cases. Schubert and Ulmer found nearly perfect intra-
55 Ulmer, The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, in JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 280 (G. Schubert ed. 1964).
561d. at 281.
57 G. SCHUBERT, QUANTiTATIVE ANALYsIs OF JuDIcIAL BEHAVIOR 130 (1959).
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group consistency in judicial votes on this type of case from 1954
through 1960, with Republican judges favoring employers and
Democratic judges supporting employees' claims. 8 With this back-
ground in view, the politically sensitive area of apportionment
would be expected to generate partisan decisions.
From 1960 through 1966, the Michigan Supreme Court's eight
major decisions affecting apportionment of the state legislature
were made by a total of 11 judges who wrote 39 opinions, an aver-
age of almost five opinions per case. In spite of this multiplicity
of views, two clearly partisan blocs emerged in the apportionment
cases, with only three of the 11 judges involved voting independ-
ently of their party's position on one or more decisions. These
blocs can be discerned through an analysis of the groups of Michi-
gan cases where partisanship appeared to be a significant element
in the decision-making process. 9
In the first series of decisions, August Scholle, president of the
state AFL-CIO, had failed to secure a population-based legislature
in Michigan through political processes. The senate, whose area-
based apportionment had been written into the state constitution
in a 1952 amendment, provided an ever-present graveyard for leg-
islation sought by labor interests in the state. 0 Scholle's decision
to turn to judicial channels to seek reapportionment was made af-
ter the Democratic party won a majority on the state supreme
court in 1957. In his suit, Scholle v. Hare,6 Scholle charged that
the 1952 amendment violated the due process and the equal protec-
tion clauses of the 14th amendment to the Constitution. He asked
that the secretary of state be enjoined from issuing 1960 election
notices until the senate reapportioned itself according to the 1908
constitution, or be required to declare all elections to the state sen-
ate at-large. Initially, respect for precedent overcame partisan
leanings. The Democratic interest to invalidate the 1952 amend-
ment was clear, but out of the ambiguity of five opinions emerged
58 Ulmer, supra note 55, at 285. See also text accompanying note 11 supra.
59 The Michigan cases are so well documented that a case by case study need not be
undertaken. See K. LAMB, W. PIERCE & J. WHITE, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRE-
SENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE (1963); R. McKAY, REAP-
PORTIONMENT: THE LAw AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 346-51 (1965);
Cooper, Civil Procedure, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 44 (1966); Quint, Constitutional Law,
13 WAYNE L. REv. 89 (1966).
60 An estimated 27 percent of the state's population could elect a majority of the
senators; no provision was made for future redistricting.
61 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960), vacated and remanded, 369 U.S. 429
(1962).
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a majority which believed that it should follow the nonjusticiable
rule of Colegrove v. Green.62  Scholle's appeal to the Supreme
Court joined the group of cases under consideration with Baker v.
Carr and won a reversal following that decision. 3
On remand, the justices had new precedent to follow on the
justiciability of apportionment controversies, but no guidelines as
to fairness. The Michigan justices were in this case "free" to vote
their personal predilections as to the value of a population-based
apportionment. Predictably, the court split on party lines, ruled
the 1952 amendment unconstitutional, and ordered the legislature
to reapportion the senate within 33 days, or face at-large elections
for that chamber."
Neither at-large elections nor reapportionment occurred in
1962. That summer, while an acrimonious constitutional conven-
tion debated apportionment provisions in Lansing, a group of Re-
publican state senators won a stay from vacationing Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart. Although Justice Black simultaneously de-
nied a similar request in an Alabama apportionment controversy,
Justice Stewart called the Michigan decision "unprecedented," and
ordered the temporary delay to give the full Court the opportunity
to review the case during the fall term.65
The constitutional convention, in addition to approving the
"80-20" formula for apportionment in the new constitution, pro-
vided for a bipartisan apportionment commission to carry out the
charter's mandate. Two structural weaknesses suggested future
difficulties for the commission: first, the representative base of the
eight man body itself was weighted by area; and secondly, with
four members from each party, partisan cohesion would lead to a
stalemate. Jurisdiction was given to the Michigan Supreme Court
in case the commission failed to agree.66
The predictable deadlock of the apportionment commission
when it met to devise districts for the 1964 election led to the sec-
ond round of apportionment cases in the Michigan Supreme
Court.67 Independent votes were cast by Republican Justice O'Hara,
62328 U.S. 549 (1946).
63369 U.S. 429 (1962).
64 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), cert denied, 377 U.S.
990 (1964). The decision was 4-to-3 because Democratic Justice Adams, who had
been attorney general at the time of the first decision, disqualified himself.
65 See 18 CoNG. Q. ALmANAC, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1058 (1962).
6 MICH. CoNsT. art. 4, § 6 (1963).
6 7 In re Apportionment, 373 Mich. 250, 128 N.W.2d 722 (1964); In -re Apportion-
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 401
who reluctantly recorded his respect for the higher authority of
Reynolds v. Sims, and by Democratic Justices Black and Adams,
who were more generous than their colleagues in allowing Repub-
lican members of the commission additional time to devise a popu-
lation-based plan of apportionment. 8 The majority of the justices,
however, voted in every case in accord with their stated personal
and political preferences. The Democratic majority on the bench
provided the votes to validate the Democratic commissioners' (Aus-
tin-Kleiner) plan of apportionment for the 1964 legislative elec-
tion.
The Democratic presidential landslide of 1964 turned the Mich-
igan Assembly over to the Democratic party with unprecedented
majorities in both houses, " confirming the worst fears of oppo-
nents of the Austin-Kleiner plan. Although Democratic strength
in the legislature was reduced to a minority again in 1966,7° the
court battles in the third round of apportionment cases were
fought in an acrid atmosphere, and revolved around the single
question of a Democratic gerrymander. 1
Thirty-four Republican citizens, organized by Maxwell Badgley,
sought invalidation of the Austin-Kleiner plan in the state supreme
court on the ground that the federal standard of "fair and effec-
tive representation" had been violated by a partisan gerrymander.
Cited as extrinsic evidence of a Democratic gerrymander were the
dismemberment of political units (county, city, and township),
in such a way as to silence "the effective political voice of the
ment, 372 Mich. 418, 128 N.W.2d 350, modified and vacated, 373 Mich. 247, 128
N.W.2d 721 (1964).
68 Background factors may explain the deviance from the party's position in the
cases of the Democratic independents. Justice Black had been a Republican attorney
general in the 1940's, had switched parties because of personal differences with the
then Republican governor, and had maintained a maverick position within his new
party. Justice Adams, whose political career began in the rural, Democratic Upper
Peninsula, represented a small sector of the state Democratic party traditionally op-
posed to reapportionment. Discounting background factors, Gething has classified
the Democratic independents with Justice O'Hara as the "non-activists" on the bench.
Each expressed his personal preference, at some point in the controversy, in accord
with the position of his party; but each voted one or more times to implement the op-
posite system, basing his deviant vote on either judicial restraint or stare decisis. See
J. Gething, supra note 9, at 194.
69 The Democratic party won 60.5 percent of the senate seats and 66.4 percent of
the house.
70 Democratic seats comprised 47.4 percent of the total in the senate, and 50.0 per-
cent in the house. Two Democratic deaths in the house permitted the Republicans to
organize the legislature.
71 In re Apportionment, 376 Mich. 410, 137 N.W.2d 495 (1965), aff'd on -re-
hearing, 377 Mich. 396, 140 N.W.2d 436, appeal dismissed sub nom. Badgley v.
Hare, 385 U.S. 114 (1966).
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community"; 72 and use by the Democratic commissioners of vot-
ing data, specifically, results from the 1962 state treasurer's con-
test, to guide the drawing of district lines in such a way as to maxi-
mize Democratic strength and minimize Republican votes.73 The
petitioners sought to initiate discovery procedures to ascertain the
motivations of the commissioners.
The petitioners agrued that the evidence they sought was com-
parable to that relied on in New York, where it was held that a
prima fade case of gerrymandering had been made when it was
shown that: (1) reapportionment had been accomplished by a
special, lame duck session of the legislature called and completed
just prior to the 1964 election when change in party control was
expected; (2) a letter by an important participant stated "our
sole consideration in that respect was how best to serve the inter-
ests of those who were enrolled within our own party"; and (3)
there were unexplained oddities in the shapes of selected districts.74
The defendants argued that even if a showing of partisan motiva-
tion could be made, the apportionment would not be tainted if
otherwise valid. The validity of an administrative or legislative
act could not, as a matter of precedent in the state courts, be made
to depend on the state of mind of those who passed it. By a par-
tisan vote, discovery procedures were denied. The three Repub-
lican justices dissented, protesting that the process would facilitate
obtaining evidence, while the Democratic majority ruled that dis-
covery would encourage sensationalism and that "the motivations,
cogitations and machinations of the commissioners, even if dis-
coverable, would not be relevant." 75
The Republican petitioners thus lost in the Democratic domi-
nated judicial arena what the party had gained in the Republican
dominated constitutional convention and what it had held for
many years in the Republican dominated legislature. By appeal-
ing to the Supreme Court, they hoped to find a more favorable
forum for their charge that the partisan gerrymander violated the
equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The Court rein-
forced its policy of refusing to consider this question by dismissing
7 2 Reply brief for Petitioners at 29, In re Apportionment, 376 Mich. 410, 137
N.W.2d 495 (1965).
73 Id. at 34-35.
741n re Orans, 45 Misc. 2d 616, 649, 257 N.Y.S.2d 839, 865, af!'d on other
grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 339, 206 N.E.2d 854, 258 N.Y.S.2d 825, appeal dismissed, 382
U.s. 10 (1965).
75 377 Mich. at 453, 140 N.W.2d at 459 (1966).
19691
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 401
the appeal on November 21, 1966.76 The Democratic and labor
forces in Michigan had successfully limited the scope of the con-
flict to the state judicial arena in which they had majority repre-
sentation.
The traditional myth of judicial impartiality requires that courts
remain aloof from questions relating to the distribution of political
power. The findings in the apportionment cases nonetheless sug-
gest that partisan values assume a significant role in the resolution
of reapportionment controversies, and that in both the lower fed-
eral and state courts, there is little if any difference between the be-
havior of elective or appointive judges. Hence, as the judiciary ac-
quires a representative position it applies a decision-making process
incorporating standards of judgment which enable particular inter-
est groups to gain or conserve advantages in the political system.
The American Bar Association and the American Judicature
Society, implicitly recognizing this representative aspect of judicial
behavior, but rejecting its propriety, have called for the establish-
ment of some means to ensure the appointment of equal numbers
of Republicans and Democrats in the federal judiciary. Were such
a goal possible to achieve, it would, by institutionalizing biparti-
sanship, prevent the operation of representative forces in an im-
portant sphere of judicial decision-making.77
The suggestion, however, offers no real solution to the prob-
lem, and would only perpetuate a system of partisanship in the
courts. In the course of the Michigan apportionment controversy
Republican Chief Justice Dethmers of the Michigan Supreme Court
asked in the course of the Michigan apportionment controversy,
"[clan officials be expected to hand down impartial decisions when
76 Badgley v. Hare, 385 U.S. 114 (1966).
77 See Nagel, Unequal Party Representation on the State Supreme Court, 45 J.
AM. JuD. Soc'Y 62 (1961). Using 1955 data on the partisan affiliation of state su-
preme court judges, Nagel found that in the South, 92 percent of the highest state
cort judges were Democratic, while the region, as measured by the 1954 congressional
vote, was only 76 percent Democratic. In the rest of the nation, 33 percent of the
highest state court judges were Democratic, in contrast to 47 percent of the congres-
sional vote. Nagel suggests several means to bring about a proportional representa-
tion of the parties in these courts. In elective states, Nagel advocates the reapportion-
ment of judicial districts, on the assumption that the application of the "one man, one
vote" principle would automatically create representative judiciaries. In appointive
states, he suggests that appointments could be required, not of equal numbers of judges
from each party as advocated by bar groups, but of proportional numbers. Id. at 65.
Difficulties which would arise in implementing this proposal include means of ac-
commodating long-term or life appointments to shifts in political sentiment, and
choice of the measure by which the partisan division is to be determined.
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those decisions may affect their reelection? 7 81 Ideally, of course,
they should, but the evidence here shows a deeper phenomenon at
work, involving underlying value structures that will not easily be
managed by adjustment of selection methods.
78 Ulmer, supra note 55, at 281.
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